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Expanding Notions of Self-Determination:
International Customs of Informed Consent in Medical
Experimentation Pre-1945
Laurel Hattix*

Abstract
In the current era, obtaining informed consent is seen as a touchstone of ethical
experimentation. However, the divergent ways in which informed consent is applied in practice
have made courts the site of a confrontation between the sometimes contradictory moral, medical,
and political dimensions of human experimentation. Arguably, the most notorious example of
these competing interests clashing in the legal sphere was The Doctors Trial—the first of the
twelve trials that were known collectively as the Nuremberg Trials. During the military tribunal
proceeding, twenty-three German physicians and administrators were tried for their participation
in war crimes and crimes against humanity—including the employment of a euthanasia program
and coordinated experimentation involving non-consenting concentration camp prisoners. On
August 19, 1947, the verdict included ten points defining legitimate research, the first of which
was: “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.” These ten points
comprise The Nuremberg Code, which modern scholars deem to be the first major document to
outline the principle of consent. However, just sixteen years prior to the verdict, in 1931,
Germany enacted a set of provisions that contained no less adequate provisions guiding human
experimentation. This Comment utilizes a legal-historical analysis in order to assess whether the
international custom of informed consent in medical experimentation predates the Nuremberg
Trials. The assertion that informed consent merely appeared in the twentieth century will be
refuted by analysis that reveals concepts of consent have long been essential to the medical tradition.
Utilizing relevant records, treaties, cases, and political responses to experimentation, and
concluding that the practice of consent was both widespread and legally obligatory, this Comment
will provide countervailing evidence of international custom of informed consent as having been
established prior to 1945.
*
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
In 2010, former United States President Barack Obama issued an apology
for unethical experiments conducted by the U.S. government in Guatemala.1
During the course of an experiment funded by the National Institutes of Health,
officials conducted research on over five thousand vulnerable Guatemalan
people—without their consent.2 At least 1,308 individuals were deliberately
infected with sexually transmitted infections (STIs).3 The public had no
knowledge of the experiments, which began in 1946, until a historian uncovered
the archived papers of the medical officer who conducted them, Charles Cutler,
more than half a century later.4 On August 20, 1947, the Nuremberg Doctors’
Trial found seventeen physicians guilty of crimes based on the non-consensual
nature of experiments conducted on individuals imprisoned in concentration
camps. Despite the highly-publicized outcome of the trial, the non-consensual
experimentation conducted by Charles Cutler did not end until December 1948,
and the follow-up work continued through 1953.5
While the atrocities exposed at the Nuremberg Trials led to a collective
declaration of “never again,”6 there had been, and would continue to be,
numerous instances of non-consensual human experimentation despite what I
will argue is an already-existing requirement of consent.7 During the same
1

2
3
4

5

6

7

Michael A. Rodriguez & Robert Garcia, First, Do No Harm: The U.S. Sexually Transmitted Disease
Experiments in Guatemala, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2122, 2122 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Oliver Laughland, Guatemalans Deliberately Infected with STDs Sue Johns Hopkins University for $1Bn,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/5YJ5-C74S.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, “‘ETHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE’:
STD RESEARCH IN GUATEMALA FROM 1946 TO 1948,” 6 (2011), https://perma.cc/DQF2-YD64.
John Shattuck, Legacy and Nuremberg: Confronting Genocide and the Terrorism through the Rule of Law, 10
GONZ. J. INT’L L. 6, 6 (2007) (“[T]hey looked back at the Holocaust and collectively declared,
‘Never again,’ by drafting an international treaty on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.”); Daniel Levy & Natan Sznaider, The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality: The
Holocaust and Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. RTS. 143, 143 (2004) (“The ongoing association between
crimes against humanity and the Holocaust is also apparent in the legal narratives that have
invoked the notion of such crimes. Nothing legitimizes human rights work more than the slogan
‘Never Again!’ And behind that imperative is the memory of the Holocaust. It is a mark of just
how deeply that memory has saturated our everyday consciousness that the phrase ‘Never Again’
does not require any further specification for us to know what it refers to.”).
Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Trial
Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 861–62 (1997). For a historical overview of the international
failure to uphold the promise of “never again,” see Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: From
an Idea to an International Norm, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 15, 15 (Richard H. Cooper & Juliette Voïnov Kohler eds., 2009) (“‘Never
again’ we said after the Holocaust. And after the Cambodian genocide in the 1970s. And then
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period, American physicians exploited black farmers in Tuskegee,8 Japanese
researchers violated the autonomy of prisoners of war, 9 and Canadian
pediatricians starved aboriginal children as part of nutritional studies. 10
Experiments, both preceding and succeeding the Nuremberg Trials, have
illuminated tensions between various competing values—mainly, scientific
inquiry, medical advancement, and respect for subjects.11 At the intersection of
these values, the law has grappled with its role in human experimentation.
Over time, one of the primary legal doctrines that developed around
human experimentation was the principle of informed consent.12 Despite its
prominence in both legal and bioethical studies, the specific contours of
informed consent remain contested and the subject of spirited debate.13
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, in the case of the 1946 Guatemala STI
experiment, a U.S. district court found that “there [was] no doubt” that the
government “engaged in nonconsensual human experimentation.”14 The district
court found that nonconsensual medical experimentation violates customary
international law.15 In its order, the district court cited Abdullahi v. Pfizer,
Inc._16 where the Second Circuit determined that the authority for the
international custom of informed consent was found in The Nuremberg
Code, the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, the guidelines
of the Council for W0)O+0i)I/0iF ;+Ki0Ibi)I/0* /M TOQIRiF 8RIO0RO*_ i0Q

8

9

10

again after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. And then, just a year later, after the Srebrenica
massacre in Bosnia. And now we’re asking ourselves, yet again, in the face of more mass killing
and dying in Darfur, whether we really are ever going to be capable, as an international
community, of stopping nation-states from murdering their own people. How many more times
will we look back wondering, with varying degrees of incomprehension, horror, anger, and shame,
how we could have let it all happen?”).
Lynn M. Harter et al., President Clinton’s Apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment: A Narrative of
Remembrance, Redefinition, and Reconciliation, 11 HOW. J. COMM. 19 (2000).
Gerhard Baader et al., Pathways to Human Experimentation, 1933–1945: Germany, Japan and the United
States, 20 OSIRIS 205, 220 (2005).
See Noni E. MacDonald et al., Canada’s Shameful History of Nutrition Research on Residential School
Children: The Need for Strong Medical Ethics in Aboriginal Health Research, 19 PEDIATRICS & CHILD
HEALTH 64 (2014).

11

See generally FRANCES R. FRANKENBURG, HUMAN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: FROM SMALLPOX
VACCINES TO SECRET GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (2017).

12

George H. Martin Jr., Informed Consent and Medical Experimentation, 3 IUSTITIA 29, 29 (1975).
John Fletcher, Ethics in the Consent Situation, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 620, 627 (1967) (“Within
the complex of problems associated with human experimentation, there are several reasons to
conclude that the consent situation will be the focal point of the most serious legal difficulties and
moral dilemmas.”).
Estate of Arturo Giron Alvarez v. Johns Hopkins Univ., No. MJG-15-950, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
193053, at 677 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2017).
Id. at 17 (quoting Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009)).

13

14

15
16

Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.17
Regardless of this relative clarity, the history of nonconsensual experimentation
that predates these devices raises a significant question: was the custom of
consent established prior to the Nuremberg Trials?
The import of this question is situated in a larger inquiry: why
does international law matter at all? For constructivists, “states create and
follow international law not because of their instrumental benefits or
penalties from complying, but because of their moral and social commitment to
ideas embodied in treaties.”18 Under this framework, the question of consent
in the arena of medical experimentation may illuminate norms, preferences,
and interactions, which reflect movements aimed at developing formal
frameworks for assessing human dignity and autonomy.19 In this way, the
development of customary international law, if it is viewed as legitimate, may
speak to “contemporary social aspirations and the larger moral fabric of
society.”20 By approaching this question through an assessment of legal
history and development of obligation, this Comment seeks to situate “law in
its broader social context”—to allow for “cultural explanations of behavior
and identity formation.”21 In exploring counter-narratives, this analysis
contributes to, but also challenges, the majoritarian story about
consent in medical experimentation. In adding a multiplicity of stories to
this conversation, the goal of the Comment is to disarm presumptions that
prior to Nuremberg, conversations, debates and obligations to research
subjects did not exist.
Currently, the prevailing view of medical historians is that informed
consent had no established place in the medical tradition until the mid-twentieth
century.22 This widely endorsed view is put forth by physician and medical
ethicist, Jacob “Jay” Katz.23 While Katz’s assertions primarily deal with consent
in the context of treatment, his claims remain relevant to the context of
experimentation. Undergirding the concept of consent in both medical
treatment and experimentation is the principle of autonomy. In both
circumstances, consent is sought to protect the right to be free from an
17
18
19
20

21

Id.
Shima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. R. 743, 756 (2013).
Id. at 757.
Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Laws and
Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743, 749 (2001).
Id. at 750.

22

Kathleen E. Powderly, Patient Consent and Negotiation in the Brooklyn Gynecological Practice of Alexander
J.C. Skene: 1863–1900, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 12, 12 (2000).

23

Id.
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unsolicited invasion of bodily integrity.24 While, in the context of
experimentation, the calculus of informed consent may be complicated by the
fact that the risks the procedures pose to the subject are less evident, the most
basic understandings of informed consent can reasonably be conflated: “The
doctrine of informed consent was developed to protect the right of every
individual to participate in decision making about his own medical care.”25 In
this way, the bedrock principle of informed consent operates in functionally
equivalent ways in both the treatment and experimentation contexts. The notion
of individual autonomy is particularly appropriate within the scope of this
Comment, which seeks to assert that the custom of consent established pre1945 was merely the deliberate giving of permission.26
Katz’s view centers on the notion that “disclosure and consent . . . have no
historical roots in medical practice.”27 Instead, Katz argues that the concept of
informed consent entered medical consciousness in the 1957 case of Salgo v.
Leland Stanford, Jr., University Board of Trustees.28 His assessment posits ancient
medical tradition as antithetical to understandings of individual autonomy,
because the paternalistic authority of doctors allowed them to direct treatment
without any consideration of the patients’ understandings of their treatment
options or undesired risks.29 As evidence for his position, Katz cites
Hippocrates’ view that physicians should primarily offer reassurance and hope,
rather than explain the intrinsic uncertainty of medical practice.30 While Katz
acknowledges some exceptions, he generally asserts that, when early doctors did

24

However, this is not to say that there are always compelling justifications for conflating
understandings of consent in both the treatment and experimentation context. See AURORA
PLOMER, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL BIOETHICS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 49 (2005) (“Notwithstanding judicial trends in the US to conflate liability for
innovative or experimental medical treatment with liability for standard medical treatment, there
are, as Dieter Giesen argues, compelling reasons to distinguish the two: ‘the individual doctor
trying out new techniques is undeniably engaged in medical experimentation. It is unacceptable
. . . to place the burden of this experimentation upon the patient by confining his right of
recovery in relation to consent to the tort of negligence.’”).

25

Maria Woltjen, Regulation of Informed Consent in Human Experimentation, 17 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 507,
512 (1986).

26

This limiting factor is discussed further in Section II, infra.
Martin S. Pernick, The Patient’s Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in
Medical Therapy, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 1, 1 (1982).
317 P.2d 170 (1957).

27

28
29
30

Powderly, supra note 22, at 12.
Id. at 12–13 (“Katz cites Hippocrates who had promoted this tradition when he said: Life is short,
the Art long, Opportunity fleeting, Experiment treacherous, Judgment difficult. The physician
must be ready, not only to do his duty himself, but also to secure the co-operation of the patient,
of the attendants and of externals.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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educate their patients, the reasons were steeped in paternalism and not the
promotion of autonomy.31
While Katz may hold the majority view of medical historians, 32 others have
argued that historical analysis lends itself to the idea that consent and autonomy
have long been a part of medical tradition.33 Historian Martin Pernick is the best
known proponent of this viewpoint, which suggests that “truth-telling” and
“consent-seeking” have long been part of medicine.34 Underlying these practices
were “medical theories that taught that knowledge and autonomy had
demonstrably beneficial effects on most patients’ health.”35 Based on case
records, Pernick argues that autonomy, though not as fundamentally important
as it is understood to be today, played a significant part in medical practice
before the twentieth century legal landmarks most frequently referenced today.36
Consent offered individuals the opportunity to make a judgment about whether
to accept or reject the treatment proposed by a physician. Autonomy requires
that an individual be able to accept or reject medical intervention, and choose
between alternative interventions, in both the treatment and experimentation
context. In this way, autonomy is realized by principles of informed consent.
Even some who favor Katz’s position dispute his assertion that “the
doctrine of informed consent surfaced, seemingly out of nowhere.”37
Reconciling the positions of Katz and Pernick, physician Ruth Faden and
scholar Tom Beauchamp provide a historical analysis that demonstrates
nineteenth-century consent and disclosure practices in both clinical medicine
and research.38 Their position is distinct from Pernick’s in that the underlying
ethos of these practices was the benefit of the individual, rather than a process
focused on ensuring individual autonomy.39 In their view, rights-oriented social
movements of the late twentieth century ushered in new understandings of
informed consent—understandings by which consent was seen as deriving from
the right of self-determination.40

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39
40

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Pernick, supra note 27, at 2.
Lori B. Andrews, The Right and Rite of Informed Consent, 21 L. & SOC’Y R. 765, 767 (1988).
Id.
Powderly, supra note 22, at 13–14.
Andrews, supra note 34, at 766.
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
(1986).
Id.
Andrews, supra note 34, at 769.
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Following the viewpoint presented by Pernick, and utilizing physician
records, legal and political responses to experimentation, and philosophical
articulations of self-determination, this Comment argues that the international
custom of consent in medical experimentation predates the Nuremberg Trials.41
Specifically, this legal-historical analysis will assert that prior to 1945 consent, the
voluntary giving of permission for experimental intervention,42 was widespread,
and researchers engaged with consent practices because of a perceived legal
obligation. This Comment does not allege that the medical and legal
communities reached a consensus on understanding consent, nor does it
contend that examples of non-consensual experimentation infrequent; rather, it
provides countervailing evidence of clear ethical and legal obligations of
informed consent prior to 1945.
While this Comment approaches the question of the prevalence of consent
pre-Nuremberg through a historical analysis, the stakes and implications of this
Comment extend beyond the merely hypothetical or academic. This
determination of custom necessitates accountability for previously inactionable
claims, and heightens future accountability for researchers and institutions.
While the opportunity for individuals to litigate claims may be procedurally
limited, renewed attention to the legal norm surrounding medical
experimentation may expose previously harbored atrocities. This is more
plausible in light of the fact that the Guatemalan experiments only came into
public consciousness in 2010, over sixty years after they had officially ended, and
descendants finally had their day in court beginning in 2017.43 Even if
unsuccessfully litigated, the expanded opportunity and incentive for these stories
to come to the surface could impact future accountability for the institutions
that bear responsibility for such exploitation. This is likely to arise in the context
of non-litigation-based reparations, such as funds, monuments, rigorous training,
or revised standards.44

41

The consent discussed here is not informed consent; rather, it follows the basic definition
outlined in Section II.

42

This Comment does not contend that the custom of consent pre-Nuremberg fully comports with
modern understandings of consent.

43

Colin Campbell, Judge Allows $1 Billion ‘Guatemalan Experiment’ Suit Against Hopkins and Others to
Move Forward, BALT. SUN (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-md-hopkinsguatemala-suit-20170831-story.html.
For example, in the case of the Tuskegee experiments, which was settled out of court, the U.S.
government guaranteed lifetime medical benefits and burial services to all living participants
through the Tuskegee Health Benefit Program. The program later expanded the benefits to
include health, as well as medical, and wives, widows, and children were added to the program. See
Claudia R. Baquet et al., Clinical Trials: The Art of Enrollment, 24 SEMIN. IN ONCOLOGY NURSING
262, 265 (2008).

44
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Additionally, in setting forth the Nuremberg Trials as the first articulation
of the necessity of consent, states, particularly the U.S., engaged in a form of
exceptionalism relating to a history of exploiting marginalized peoples in the
name of medical progress. This may be connected to the lure for Western
physicians to conduct human experimentation outside their home states. Being
aware of both the moral boundaries and legal consequences of human
experimentation without consent, an unscrupulous physician would have clear
incentive to conduct their research in communities where legal intervention was
inaccessible and where their subjects would fall beyond the gaze of the world’s
eye.45
Having considered the stakes and opportunities, the Comment advances as
follows. Section I describes theoretical understandings of customary
international law as well as the current state of informed consent as provided by
international treaties, and global regulations and procedures devoted to human
experimentation. Section II assesses the relevant treaties, records, and political
and legal responses to experimentation prior to 1945 as evidence of state
practice and opinio juris. Section III considers the legal and historical contours of
the Nuremberg Trials themselves as evidence of pre-existing informed consent
norms and analyzes post-Nuremberg documents to assess how they reinforce
the longstanding customary tradition that the Comment identifies. Section IV
directly assesses the ways in which the preceding historical analysis bears on the
claim of custom predating Nuremberg and addresses the limitations of the
Comment.

II. C ONSENT AS E STABLISHED C US TOMARY
I NTERNATIONAL L AW
A. Customary International Law
According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), customary
international law is defined as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 46
Despite varying scholarly positions, the prevailing view is that customary
international law is established by two elements: (1) the repeated and widespread
conduct of States, and (2) the belief that this conduct is engaged in on the basis
45

46

Support for this claim can be found in the writing of R.C. Arnold, who supervised Dr. John C.
Cutler, the lead physician in the experimentation in Guatemala. See Susan M. Reverby, “Normal
Exposure” and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS “Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946-1948, 23 J. POL’Y
HIST. 6, 18 (2011) (“I am a bit, in fact more than a bit, leery of the experiment with the insane
people. They can not give consent, do not know what is going on, and if some goody
organization got wind of the work, they would raise a lot of smoke.”).
Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
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of a legal obligation.47 The first element, the objective component, evaluates the
practice of states—primarily what they say and do. The second element, known
as opinio juris, is the principal concern of customary international law—“[i]t is
what distinguishes a national act done voluntarily . . . from one that a nation
follows because it is required to do so by law.”48 In this way, custom requires the
normative belief that the act or conduct must be followed—this is distinct from
conduct formed out of “mere habit or convenience.”49 It is the internalization of
these norms and the belief that behavior must conform to it that gives
customary law its legitimacy.
International law primarily arises out of two sources: treaties and
customary international law.50 Rather than the formal process utilized in treaty
rules, “rules of customary international law arise out of frequently ambiguous
combinations of behavioral regularity and expressed or inferred
acknowledgements of legality.”51 Despite the comparative informality in their
formation, customary rules play an important role in international law. Where
topics have yet to be formally negotiated, where states are not party to formal
treaties, or where relevant enforcement mechanisms do not exist, customary
international law provides a basis for constraining behavior and providing
accountability.52 Particularly in the context of human rights and bodily
autonomy, the legitimizing impact of customary international law may act as a
prominent tool of justice. Where individuals or institutions have disregarded
human rights, custom can reinforce principles of justice—even where a state’s
own law fails to grant individuals the full protection of those rights.
Traditionally, customary international law is viewed as universal in the sense that
it applies to “all states regardless of their culture or political system.” 53 This
consideration is based on the overarching custom of pacta sunt servanda,54 which
assumes that states will perform their binding obligations in good faith.55
47

Id.

48

Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113, 1116 (1999).

49

J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 462 (2000).
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 48, at 1113.

50
51

MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1999).

52

Id. at 3–4. But see Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the Grotian Moment: Accelerated Formation of Customary
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 445 (2010) (“Normally,
customary international law, which is just as binding on states as treaty law, arises out of the slow
accretion of widespread state practice evincing a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris).”).

53

Kelly, supra note 49, at 451.
Latin for “agreements must be kept.”

54
55

Kelly, supra note 49, at 452.
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Despite relatively uniform understandings of these elements, there is
widespread disagreement about what constitutes evidence of state practice.56 The
least controversial sources include domestic legislation, policy statements, and
diplomatic correspondence, whereas the most controversial sources include
nonbinding statements and resolutions.57 Treaties have been utilized as evidence
of customary international law, but their use lacks consistency.58 Additionally,
there are divergences in determining the practical contours of just how
“widespread” and “uniform” a state practice must be.59 Due to the
impracticability of an analysis that includes the practices of all nations, these
inquiries typically focus on global powers and concerned states. However, it has
become increasingly common to ignore state practice altogether in scholarly
analysis of customary international law.60 Notwithstanding these fundamental
uncertainties and discrepancies, custom remains a central component of
international law.

B. Understandings of Consent
It is necessary to discuss the definition of consent in order to explore when
the concept arose, because the impartation of modern medical technology and
processes of international law have created varied and contested definitions.
Additionally, definitions of consent have varied in different contexts—for
example, courts of law and medical guidelines understand the term differently. 61
Due to the variety of meanings attached to “consent” and its development over
time, it is important to set out the definitions and limitations of consent
contemplated in this Comment.62 An ideal situation of human experimentation
that would require consent would involve a researcher seeking the participation
of a subject.63 The individual’s participation would involve “some alteration of
56
57
58
59
60

61

Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 48, at 1117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“For example, they refer to a CIL prohibition on torture at the same time that they
acknowledge that many nations of the world torture their citizens. It is thus unclear when, and to
what degree, the state practice requirement must be satisfied.”).
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 38, at 4 (“The law’s approach springs from a pragmatic theory.
Although the patient is granted a right to consent or refuse, the focus is on the physician, who
holds a duty and who risks liability by failure to fulfill the duty. Moral philosophy’s approach
springs from a principle of respect for autonomy that focuses on the patient or subject, who has a
right to make an autonomous choice.”).

62

Onora O’Neill, Symposium on Consent and Confidentiality: Some Limits of Informed Consent, 29 J. MED.
ETHICS 4 (2002).

63

Fletcher, supra note 13, at 633.
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the subject’s mental, physical, or social functioning, with the scientist planning to
observe and record the results.”64 Within this process, the subject may
experience pain, discomfort, or a temporary loss of rights.65
Evolutions in understandings of informed consent, as well as the
divergences in its definition, present a complex question—what qualifies as
consent? This question expands a tension between choosing criteria lax enough
to render the term meaningless and criteria so demanding as to render it
impossible to conduct any meaningful historical analysis. Consent, as referenced
in this paper, will refer to a singular condition: consent that involves the
“intentional giving of permission for an intervention.”66 This definition does not
comport to modern articulations of informed consent, which have been
elaborated to account for information asymmetries, coercion, and the
vulnerability of certain populations.67 In fact, this definition alone is not
satisfactory to render an experiment “ethical” or establish that it comports with
international legal standards.
However, there are several reasons to prefer this definition. First, early
records and research accounts do not provide substantial evidence to determine
whether consent was informed.68 Historical documents often reference
“consent” or “voluntariness,” but fail to give any further information, such as
what information was given to a subject. Second, even in a post-Nuremberg
Code world, key questions about the contours of informed consent remain
unanswered. Both the legal and medical fields have struggled to answer the most
basic of issues: How much information must be disclosed to a subject before
they can make an informed decision?69 How does one determine if a subject
lacks the mental competence to make an informed choice?70 Third, the debate
around the trajectory of consent is complicated by changing historical, social,
and technological landscapes. “[C]hanges in medical technology, medical theory,
professional power, and social structure all have interacted over time to shape
the changing role of the patient in medical decision-making.”71 By narrowing the
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id.
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 38, at 54.
Id. at 372.

68

Id. at 54–55 (“For example, in the diaries of nineteenth-century surgeons, statements may be
found that the surgeon advised amputation of an infected leg and that the patient agreed or consented.
Without more evidence, we cannot discern whether this reported “consent” was based on
accurate and adequate information.”) (emphasis in original).

69

Pernick, supra note 27, at 1.
Id.

70
71

Id. at 3.
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understanding of consent to mere permission for intervention, this Comment
attempts to take into account these changes, while simultaneously presenting an
underlying conception of consent that has historical longevity and continuity.72
Lastly, it should be noted that while the Comment’s argument deals
specifically with consent in the arena of medical experimentation, there are
examples, cases, and records utilized in the analysis that refer to consent as it
relates to treatment. While these areas of medicine, and the consent
requirements surrounding them, are fundamentally distinct, there are points of
commonality that provide a richer analysis.
There are several differences between medical treatment and medical
experimentation. First, “[i]n the area of human experimentation, the researcher’s
goal of acquiring new information and the subject’s rights may inherently
conflict.”73 Second, personal ethics may be insufficient to constrain a researcher
who faces opportunities for career advancement.74 It is for this reason that
modern medical institutions have developed robust, but not necessarily
sufficient, procedures such as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).75 Third, in a
research setting, the care an individual receives is “not chosen exclusively out of
a concern for his or her well-being, but with regard to the success of the
experiment design.”76 More obvious, but equally important, is that the risks of
experimentation are often not known in advance—hence the need for the
research.77 It is for this reason that “[t]here is almost universal agreement that
the requirement of informed consent should be applied more rigorously in
connection with experimental procedures, or ‘research,’ than with standard
medical or psychological treatments.”78 Scholars have summed up the difference
between the two contexts as being twofold:

72

73
74
75

There are, of course, many counterpoints to the decision to narrowing the understanding of
consent. One may assert that this narrow definition excludes much of what would make this
argument meaningful; however, non-informed consent as a baseline ethical principle still serves
important theoretical and legal functions. Consent, presented as mere permission for intervention,
still serves to address the underlying right at issue—the right of bodily autonomy. Establishing
this basic right in the most discernible scenarios establishes a foundation to being able to assert
the right in the infinitely more complex modern circumstances, which may introduce questions of
technology, globalization, and sociopolitical realities.
Woltjen, supra note 25, at 513.
Id. at 513–14.
Id.

76

CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY
(1974).

77

Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap
Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 68 n. 1 (1986).

78

Id. at 67.
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The ostensible differences between the therapeutic and experimental
contexts may be resolved into two components: in the therapeutic context it
is supposed that the physician knows what the sequelae to treatment will be,
which information, by definition, is not available in the experimentation
situation; and in the therapeutic context the doctor may be said to be
seeking his patient’s good, in contrast to the experimental context where
some other good is being sought.79

Nevertheless, there are various similarities between treatment and
experimentation that render the utilization of both examples appropriate for the
purposes of the Comment. First, the underlying moral necessity for consent in
both situations is identical: the right to consent derives from a recognition of the
individual capacity to make determinations about invasions of bodily integrity. 80
Conversely, the consequences of failing to recognize valid consent in both
situations can constitute a denial of personhood, but may also have devastating
psychological and psychosocial results.81 In examining consent in the treatment
context, the outgrowth of principles will be the focus of the inquiry: these
principles also underlay the ethos of consent in the medical experimentation
context—mainly, the right against bodily invasion without deliberate approval.

C. The Current State of Informed Consent
While the previous section emphasized the need to move away from
informed consent as the basis for the custom that this Comment seeks to
discover, it is nevertheless important to understand the current state of the law
involving informed consent. There are two reasons for this: (1) to show that the
modern doctrine was an outgrowth of the historical principle, and (2) to
demonstrate the ways in which, even in the modern era, the specific contours
around consent are unsettled.82 However, the current state of informed consent
is not the standard by which the relevant historical material will be judged.
While ever-evolving, the modern notion of informed consent is based on
three basic principles: capacity, disclosure, and voluntariness.83 Despite general
79

Benjamin Freedman, A Moral Theory of Informed Consent, 5 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32, 34 (1975).

80

Id. at 32 (“[O]ur capacities for personhood ought to be recognized by all—these capacities
including the capacity for rational decision, and for action consequent upon rational decision.”).

81

Id. at 33.
Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed Consent, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 855,
856 (2015) (“Most accept that in practice, particular aspects of informed consent vary by context,
and both scholars and practitioners continue to debate these aspects—such as the scope and level
of detail provided and the methods of disclosure, whether and how to assess comprehension,
what constitutes necessary and sufficient understanding for valid consent, approaches to assessing
persons’ capacity to consent and steps taken when they lack that capacity, how to know when
choices are sufficiently voluntary, and issues concerning documentation of consent.”).

82

83

Edward Etchells, Informed Consent in Surgical Trials, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY 1215, 1215 (1999).
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consensus on these principles, a variety of modern documents elaborate on
informed consent and the requirements of medical experimentation.
Nearly all U.S. guidelines for experimentation are guided by the ethical
principles articulated in the 1979 Belmont Report.84 In 1974, the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research was established by federal law.85 In its initial charge, the
Commission was asked to “identify the basic ethical principles that should
underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavior research,” as well as develop
guidelines to ensure these principles would be followed.86 The outgrowth of
these endeavors was The Belmont Report, which states beneficence, justice, and
respect for persons as the three principles guiding the protection of human
subjects in research.87 While the Report has been critiqued for its
oversimplification of these ethical considerations, its primary function is an
analytical framework by which ethical considerations are viewed.88
The 1991 “Common Rule”89 was codified by fifteen different federal
agencies and established two main protections: (1) informed consent, and (2)
IRB requirements.90 Under the Common Rule, a subject must give “legally

84

DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23, 192 (Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46)
[hereinafter the Belmont Report]. See also Jacqueline Fox, Reinvigorating the Concept of Benefit: The
Failure of Drug Company-Sponsored Research on Human Subjects, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 605, 615–16
(2008) (“The most basic requirement of research, as demanded by the Belmont Report, is that we
must not undertake this research unless the possible benefit to society is substantial enough to
justify this use of humans. This requirement alone is certainly not enough to satisfy all ethical
requirements for proper use of human research subjects; it is a necessary but not sufficient
condition.”).

85

K.J. Ryan et al., The Belmont Report. Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, 81 J. AM. COLL. DENTISTS 4, 5 (2014).

86

Id.
Jennifer M. Sims, A Brief Review of the Belmont Report, 29 DIMENSIONS CRIT. CARE IN NURSING 173,
173–74 (2010).
The Report operates from an “ethical paradigm referred to as principlism.” In this framework,
“ethical principles are derived from moral theories.” However, studies have shown how the
principles exemplified in the Report have cross-cultural limitations. For example, “the Western
concept of autonomy focuses on the right of the individual, which contrasts to how certain Asian
cultures consider autonomous decision making.” Nancy Shore, Re-Conceptualizing the Belmont Report,
14 J. CMTY. PRACTICE 5, 6–7 (2006).
FEDERAL POLICY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (“COMMON RULE”), U.S. DEP’T.
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., https://perma.cc/8EU9-CE9B (last visited May 20, 2018).
Victoria Berkowitz, Common Courtesy: How the New Common Rule Strengthens Human Subject Protection,
54 HOUS. L. REV. 923, 936 (2017).
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effective informed consent.”91 Specifically, subjects must be given an
opportunity to contemplate participation without undue coercion or influence.
Additionally, the informed consent document must be given to the participant in
a language they understand and it must explain the purpose, provide a contact
for questions, and outline the foreseeable risks and benefits of the study. Finally,
the document must be signed and informed consent may be withdrawn at any
time for any reason without penalty.92
In 2017, a set of revisions were finalized and applied to the “Common
Rule.”93 In total, three revisions were adopted: “reduce the types of research
covered by the regulations, use a single IRB to review research conducted by
multiple institutions, and improve the informed consent process.”94
In legal analysis, informed consent, as it relates to medical experimentation,
is a norm of customary international law as evidenced by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, The Nuremberg Code, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.95 The Nuremberg Trials proved especially influential.
Following the convictions, the court set forth The Nuremberg Code. It outlined
ten standards that constitute the basic rules for conducting research on human
subjects.96 The first principle, establishing that “[t]he voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential,”97 is accompanied by two explanatory
paragraphs:
This means that the person involved should have the legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject
matter involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision. This latter element requires that, before the acceptance of an
affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there should be made
known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the
method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or
person, which may possible come from his participation in the experiment.
91

Id. at 937 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 46.116).

92

Id. at 937–38.
George J. Annas, Beyond Nazi War Crimes Experiments: Voluntary Consent Requirements of the
Nuremberg Code at 70, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 44 (2018).
Id.

93

94
95
96
97

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43.
The Nuremberg Code, originally Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law at No. 10, 181–82 (1946–1949) [hereinafter Nuremberg
Code].
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The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It
is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another
with impunity.98

On the whole, the first principle requires consent to be “voluntary, competent,
informed, and understanding.”99 Despite the evolving literature, regulations, and
international treaties regarding medical ethics, The Nuremberg Code’s emphasis
on informed consent is distinct and prominent.
Both the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expand upon the Code’s understandings of
voluntary and informed consent.100 The Geneva Convention of 1949 explicitly
prohibits the utilization of prisoners of war for medical experimentation. 101
While the Convention only applies during war, the ICCPR, which took effect in
1966, applies in both war and peace.102 Specifically, Article Seven of the ICCPR
states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”103 Seventeen years after
the convictions at Nuremberg, the Declaration of Helsinki (DOH) was
developed.104 At the time of its inception, the World Medical Association
(WMA) called it “the most widely recognized source of ethical guidelines for
biomedical research.”105 Since it was promulgated in 1964, the DOH has been
revised five times: Tokyo (1975), Venice (1983), Hong Kong (1989), South
Africa (1996), and Edinburgh (2000).106 The Declaration states:

98
99

Id.
Annas, supra note 93, at 43.

100

Id. (“The Geneva Conventions, for example, assume that prisoners of war simply cannot provide
voluntary consent to medical experiments and so prohibit them from being used in nontherapeutic experiments: No prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental, or
hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interested. (Article 13).”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

101

Id.
Id.

102
103

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].

104

Solomon Ekundayo Salako, The Declaration of Helsinki 2000: Ethical Principles and the Dignity of
Difference, 25 MED. & L. 341, 342 (2006).

105

Id. (quoting Robert V. Carlson et al., The Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: Past, Present and Future,
57 BRIT. J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 695 (2004)).

106

Id.
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Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without his free
consent, after he has been fully informed; if he is legally incompetent the
consent of the legal guardian should be procured. The subject of clinical
research should be in such a mental, physical, and legal state as to be able to
exercise fully his power of choice.107

In 1982, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Council for
International Organisation for Medical Science (CIOMS) developed the
International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.108
Revised in 2002, the Guidelines include specific provisions on vulnerable
populations and procedures relating to consent, benefits, and safeguards. 109
Fifteen years after the development of the Guidelines, the European Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ECHRB) was ratified.110 While the ECHRB
reiterated many previously articulated understandings of consent, it also
acknowledged developments in medicine such as genetic testing.

III. L EGAL -H ISTORICAL A NALYSIS OF C ONS ENT
This section analyzes research records, legal responses, or lack thereof, and
various forms of sociopolitical commentary on experimentation occurring
before 1945. These documents and histories serve as evidence of both state
practice and existing legal obligation to the principle of consent.111 The evidence
presented suggests that there were countervailing understandings of the legal
necessity of consent before Nuremberg. This evidence does not contend that
exploitation was non-existent, or that there was total consensus on the specific
contours of consent within legal and medical communities; rather, it invites
contemplation of the behaviors and acknowledgments of legal entities, medical
communities, and the public, as it pertained to consent. These narratives provide
107

World Medical Association, Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 177, 177
(1946) (accepted at Helsinki in June 1964) [hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki].

108

Salako, supra note 104, at 342.
Id.

109
110
111

Id. at 342–43.
It should be noted that the evidence presented here is largely Eurocentric. This overwhelming
emphasis should not be construed as a denial of the history of non-European nations and their
contributions to understandings of medical ethics, rights of bodily autonomy, and exercises of
accountability for human experimentation; rather, it reflects the view that classical international
law is not only borne out of a colonial history, but that imperialism is reproduced in the modern
politics of which cultural practices are excluded in considerations of custom and sovereignty. By
presenting these examples, this section does not intend to posit this conventional history as
superior or facilitate the continued marginalization of non-European peoples; instead, it is meant
to reflect the state of classical international law. This leaves the door open for future
interrogations of the way customary international law interacts with colonialism to reinforce
conventional histories as superior. See, for example, ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–12 (2004).

162

Vol. 19 No. 1

Expanding Notions of Self-Determination

Hattix

support for the conclusion that consent was established as international
customary law pre-1945 by providing examples of instances in which the right to
bodily autonomy, the ethos of consent, acted as a basis for constraining, altering,
or providing accountability for research behavior.
This section is organized in chronological order so as to give a historical
understanding of the evolution of consent. While consent in the patient
treatment context entered the lexicon in the late eighteenth century, medical
experimentation as a practice did not take off until the early-to-mid nineteenth
century; therefore, the bulk of this historical analysis focuses on this time period.

A. Early Conceptions of Consent
While pre-eighteenth century physicians focused on autonomy and had
early formations of medical ethics, the principles explored in this era offer no
substantial evidence of the widespread conduct of consent. There is evidence of
the underlying ethos of consent, the principle of autonomy as a right, prior to
the Enlightenment.112 This principle of autonomy, “developed in the
formulation of medical tradition and human rights,” has its origins in Roman
and Stoic thought dating back to 400 B.C.113 However, the first detailed
treatment of medical ethics comes from Hippocrates. Referred to as the “father
of scientific medicine,” Hippocrates developed an observational approach that
later became the foundation of medical experimentation.114 While little is known
about Hippocrates the man, the “oath bearing his name is the oldest and most
durable statement of medical ethics.”115 Despite its prominence, the Hippocratic
approach did not advocate consent; rather, in many circumstances, it advocated
intentionally concealing information so as to maintain hope.116
Despite Hippocrates’ opposition to informed consent, other philosophers
of the time gave some credence to the idea of patients participating in the
decision-making process. Plato compared “the Greek slave-physicians who gave
orders ‘in the brusque fashion of a dictator,’ and the free physician, who takes
‘the patient and his family into confidence . . . [and] does not give prescriptions
until he has won the patient support.”117 Giving even more weight to consent
was Henri De Mondeville, a French surgeon and anatomy teacher, who argued
112
113
114
115
116
117

Salako, supra note 104, at 342.
Id.
FRANKENBURG, supra note 11, at 6.
Id.
Pernick, supra note 27, at 4.
Id. at 5 (quoting Mark Siegler, Searching for Moral Certainty in Medicine: A Proposal for a New Model of
the Doctor-Patient Encounter, 57 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 56, 68 (1981)).
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that if a patient’s consent could not be obtained then a physician should not
accept the case.118 De Mondeville’s assertion was based on the idea that a defiant
patient would have worse clinical outcomes. While not substantial enough to
constitute evidence of widespread conduct, the philosophical musings of
pre-eighteenth century physicians were nevertheless significant in laying the
foundations of rights, autonomy, and joint decision-making.

B. Eighteenth Century
Evidence of consent as a constraining force during the eighteenth century
is largely limited to European common law doctrines and the subsequent case
history arising from theories of liability. For centuries in English common law,
the tort of battery served as the basis of liability against physicians who treated
patients without consent.119 This legal doctrine had one major exception—an
emergency situation.120 The focus of this theory of liability was the individual’s
bodily integrity, which meant that as a defense a physician could present
evidence that the subject had either consented, or that their non-consent could
not have been anticipated.121 Underlying the battery theory of liability was the
principle of a right to self-determination, which is “the legal equivalent of the
moral principle of respect for autonomy.”122 Eventually, the contemporary trend
shifted away from battery to negligence as the preferred theory of informed
consent liability.123
Decided in 1767 in England, Slater v. Baker & Stapleton was the first
documented case in which physicians were found liable for performing a
procedure without a patient’s consent.124 After Slater’s broken leg failed to

118

119

120
121
122
123

124

Jay Katz, Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at Nuremberg, 22 YALE J. INT’L L.
401, 409 (1997).
Pernick, supra note 27, at 4. See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 38, at 26–27 (“Under battery
theory the defendant is held liable for any intended (i.e., not careless or accidental) action that
results in physical contact—contact for which the plaintiff has given no permission, express or
implied, and which the defendant therefore knew or should have known was ‘unauthorized.’ . . .
The defendant need not have an evil intent, nor must injury result; the unpermitted contact is
itself considered offensive.”) (emphasis in original).
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 38, at 26–27.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28.
Courts have given many reasons for the shift towards negligence. Must prominent seems to be
the idea that battery, which is seen as more drastic, is only useful in “situations where the
procedure has not been disclosed at all.” See id. at 29.
John I. Gallin, A Historical Perspective on Clinical Research, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 1 (John I. Gallin & Frederick P. Ognibene eds., 3rd ed., 2012).
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properly heal, he sought treatment from a physician named Baker.125 Dr. Baker
utilized a steel contraption to stretch Slater’s leg, which led to further injury.126 A
jury awarded damages to Slater and the appeals court affirmed the award. 127 In
its decision, the English court determined that without the consent of the
patient, the utilization of such a radical instrument constituted malpractice:
[T]his was the first experiment made with this new instrument; and although
the defendants in general may be as skillful in their respective professions as
any two gentlemen in England, yet the Court cannot help saying that in this
particular case they have acted ignorantly and unskillfully, contrary to the
known rule and usage of surgeons.128

In the absence of consent, the doctors’ reckless engagement in experimentation
led to legal liability.
Outside of the courtroom, during the late eighteenth century, some
prominent European and American physicians developed the early formulations
of medical traditions that encouraged the patient’s “informed deference to the
physician’s scientific knowledge,” which in turn would be reciprocated by “the
physician’s respect for the informed patient’s autonomy.”129 While not a
complete conception of consent, physicians, including John Gregory, Thomas
Young, and Benjamin Rush, propagated these ideals as aligned with and
stimulated by, the Age of Enlightenment.130 In Rush’s view, autonomy was
essential because of the way in which it promoted individual and public health. 131
Taking it a step further, Rush also believed that this autonomy must be
predicated on accurate information; he encouraged fellow physicians to “strip
our profession of everything that looks like mystery and imposture, and clothe
medical knowledge in a dress so simple and intelligible, that it may become . . .
obvious to the meanest capacities.”132
While these early ideas did reflect some reverence for the principles of
autonomy and the need for information in order for consent to be valid, this
may be attributable to the aims of the Enlightenment period, rather than a
concerted attempt to establish ethical medical practice. Additionally, most
physicians in this era subscribed to a paternalistic model of authority rather than
125

126
127
128

129
130
131
132

George J. Annas, Doctors, Patients and Lawyers—Two Centuries of Health Law, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.
445, 446 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, C.B. Eng. Rep. 860 (Michelmas Term, 8 Geo III,
1767)).
Pernick, supra note 27, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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one based on the informed choice of the individual.133 However, some effort
was made to reconcile Rush’s view with the paternalism of the day. Thomas
Percival, one of the leading medical ethicists of his era, stated that, except in rare
emergency situations, doctors should fully disclose all relevant information to
patients.134 While this articulation did not wholly comport with informed
consent, debate about disclosure, particularly when connected with autonomy,
can be understood as foundational to later understandings of consent.

C. Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century, assisted by the invention of surgical anesthesia,
new conceptions of cleanliness, and the creation of the microscope, ushered in a
new era of medical research.135 Researchers began to utilize procedures that
allowed them to generate hypotheses and replicate their experimentation. Much
of the early human experimentation focused on the development of vaccines.
The uptick in experimentation led to an uptick in exploitation. It was normal
and accepted for researchers to conduct their experimentation on those who
were blind, I0)OFFOR)(iFFd QI*ihFOQ, poor, terminally ill, or engaged in *Oe f/+G.136
Researchers justified experimentation on these vulnerable populations by
asserting that they were already “damaged.”137
As the nineteenth century ushered in a new era of medical research,
researchers, philosophers, physicians, and scholars naturally began to weigh in
on the accompanying medical ethics as they related to experimentation. In 1845,
Dr. Maximilian Simon published the Medical Deontology, a monograph on medical
ethics.138 Within the monograph was an entire chapter dedicated to the ethics of
experimentation entitled “The Limits with which Experimentation on Human
Subjects Should be Maintained.”139 Simon insisted that a physician should under
no circumstances be able to “sacrifice the interests of the individual to those of
society”: in experimentation, the harm to an individual could not be
automatically justified by the benefits the discovery may bring to civilization as a

133
134
135
136
137
138

139

Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
FRANKENBURG, supra note 11, at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
The monograph later appeared in the twenty-first volume of the British and Foreign Medical
Review. See Alex Dracobly, Ethics and Experimentation on Human Subjects in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
France: The Story of the 1859 Syphilis Experiments, 77 BULL. HIST. MED. 332, 352 (2003).
Id.
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whole.140 Despite recognizing the necessity of experimentation for scientific
progress, Simon was clear that humanity imposed “strict duties” on the
physician—including that he or she exhaust known treatments before employing
experimental ones and never subject even the “most useless” to experimentation
that might put their lives in danger.141 While monographs of medical ethicists
were novel, medical historian Charles Daremberg noted that Simon merely
brought together commonly held views on general principles of medical
experimentation.142
In 1859, two French physicians, Joseph-Alexandre Auzias-Turenne and
Camille-Melchior Gibert, relied on the importance of their discovery as
justification for their non-consensual experiments. However, not a single
medical journal “defended their actions as morally justified.”143 At a hospital in
Paris, the physicians injected four patients who already had lupus with the
contents of syphilitic lesions.144 The outrage to the experiment was twofold: first,
the experiment itself was considered “radical,” and, second, the physicians had
not obtained consent to conduct the experimentation.145 “Although there were
no fixed rules on this question, physicians were generally expected to obtain
consent prior to risky, painful, or dangerous experimental procedures.” 146 In
total, fifteen medical periodicals reported on hearings conducted by the Imperial
Academy of Medicine on the ethical questions posed by the physicians’
procedures, and not one defended the experimentation as morally justified. 147
Nearly half unequivocally denounced the experiment’s procedures as
unethical.148
While the consequences for Auzias-Turenne and Gibert were merely
professional, there were physicians of the same period who faced legal
consequences for failing to obtain consent in their experimental procedures.
Gerhard Armauer Hansen, a Norwegian physician, focused on experimentation

140

141
142
143
144
145
146

147
148

Id. (quoting MAX SIMON, DÉONTOLOGIE MÉDICALE, OU DES
MÉDECINS DANS L’ÉTAT ACTUEL DE LA CIVILISATION 334 (1845)).
Id. at 352–53 (quoting SIMON, supra note 140, at 336–37).

DEVOIRS ET DES DROITS DES

Id. at 353.
Id. at 355.
FRANKENBURG, supra note 11, at 53.
Id.
Dracobly, supra note 138, at 358 (“Neither Simon nor Bernard discussed consent, but physicians
often made clear in their published report that they had obtained consent prior to the experiment,
especially if this involved great pain or risk.”).
Id. at 355.
Id.
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to understand how leprosy was transmitted.149 When he failed to transfer leprosy
onto artificial mediums or animals, Hansen turned to self-inoculation, but still
failed to develop leprosy.150 Unable to develop the illness after injecting himself,
Hansen then turned to experiments on patients without their consent.151 He
utilized “a cataract knife which just previously had been used to cut a nodule
from a patient suffering from nodular leprosy, on the eye of another female
patient in the hospital.”152 After the patient experienced immense physical pain
and suffering, she turned to the courts for remedy.153 Despite the fact that some
of Hansen’s colleagues defended him on the grounds that he had “made
considerable contribution to the question in mention,” the City of Bergen Law
Courts found Hansen “guilty for failure to obtain consent.”154 As a result of the
1880 court finding, Hansen lost his job as a physician.155 The legal outcome and
subsequent consequences of Hansen’s experimentation represent one of the first
times the court emphasized the importance of consent in clinical research, as
opposed to just general procedures.156 The court’s specificity here is critical—
while some contend that one cannot conflate the underlying ethos of the
consent principle without regard to context, the court provides an explicit
reference to the necessity of consent in the experimental arena.157 Additionally,
the public nature of the scrutiny of Hansen’s procedures is evidence of a
developing legal obligation. The court’s ability to find an individual who
performed an experimental procedure guilty of “failure to obtain consent”
would effectively put physicians on notice of the possibility of legal ramifications
if they fail to get consent.

149

150
151
152
153

154
155
156
157

Siang Yong Tan & Connor Graham, Armaeuer Hansen (1841-1912): Discoverer of the Cause of Leprosy,
49 SING. MED. J. 520, 520 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Gallin, supra note 124, at 9.
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The rise in the globalization of medical experimentation offers further
evidence of conduct relating to consent that was not confined to one state’s
borders nor one group of nationals. While the modern era has seen a sharp
increase in globalized medical experimentation,158 researchers were traveling to
other nations to test their medical experiments on other populations as early as
the nineteenth century. In the late 1890s, Waldemar Mordecai Wolff Haffkine, a
physician from Ukraine, travelled to India, where the population experienced
massive cholera outbreaks.159 Having tested his cholera vaccine on animals,
himself, and three Russian friends, Haffkine caught the attention of a former
colonial official, Lord Dufferin, who convinced him to travel to India, where
thousands died from cholera.
Initially, Haffkine was met with suspicion by the local population.160 In
fact, locals attacked him upon arrival, breaking some of his equipment. In an
effort to gain the locals’ trust, Haffkine performed a demonstration in which he
revaccinated himself. Once the locals saw the vaccine’s effectiveness, or possibly
the willingness of the researcher to inject himself with it, many in the community
agreed to be vaccinated. Within two years, Haffkine and his colleagues
vaccinated 42,000 individuals. In Assam, a state in northeast India, the mortality
rate from cholera dropped from “between 22–45 percent to 2 percent” as a
result of Haffkine’s vaccines.161
Following the success of his cholera vaccine, the Indian government asked
Haffkine for help in managing a deadly bubonic plague.162 After testing the
vaccine on himself, Haffkine moved his medical experimentation to Byculla jail
in Bombay, where the plague was running rampant.163 According to recollections
of his experiment, Haffkine sought volunteers, and on January 30, 1897, 143
volunteers were injected—including some outside the prison.164 He remained on
the prison premises to monitor the results. He next carried out his controlled
experiment at the Byculla House of Correction. According to records of the
experiment, 2,200 individuals were inoculated and the 6,000 that refused served
as the control group.165 At his next experimentation site, Aga Khan and 3,184 of
158
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his Khoja sect of followers were inoculated, while 9,516 refused and, again,
served as a control group.166
Beginning in 1897, physicians C.H. Bennett and W.B. Bannerman, utilized
Haffkine’s vaccine to inoculate a self-contained 26th Regiment of Madras
Infantry, which was stationed in the city of Belgaum, located in the Indian state
of Karnataka.167 While Bennet and Bannerman’s report does not detail their
procedures, it provides evidence of utilizing a procedure of consent before
inoculating subjects:
Little difficulty was experienced in persuading the men to consent to be
operated on, when it was explained to them that they would be free to
return to their lines after inoculation. The example set by General Rolland,
the Officer Commanding, and the Medical Officer, who were operated on
in front of the men, no doubt also helped to remove prejudice, and 229
sepoys were inoculated during the morning.168

Additionally, the physicians reported that out of the 1,746 individuals in
the population, only 1,665 were operated on.169 Those not operated on included
“infants, women far in advance in pregnancy, and the sick in hospitals chiefly,
although one solitary sepoy has, up to the present refused to submit to
operation.”170 Following the first inoculation, “[t]he men of the regiment were so
satisfied with the effect . . . that they made no objection to being inoculated in
August.”171
Further evidence of the utilization of some process of consent is found in a
letter to the editor published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
in 1920.172 The author, Lester H. Beals, was a physician and self-identified
“medical missionary.”173 Having assisted in over 30,000 inoculations, Beals
notes, “[w]hen we first came here the people were slow to consent to
inoculation, but they have now come to accept it readily in large numbers.”174
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While the said consent may not comport to modern standards,175 Beals
presents evidence from the field of some working knowledge about the necessity
of consent in some form. More importantly, the trans-national nature of the
vaccine experimentation taking place in India demonstrates not only an early
procedural commitment to consent, but one that was carried on outside of the
physicians’ place of origin. The continuity of consent utilized in trans-national
experimentation offers evidence that the practice of consent was not compelled
through expectations in only one geographic location.
Further evidence that the practice of consent was not merely becoming
widespread, but that physicians were seeking consent out of a sense of legal
obligation, is the way in which physicians directly responded to and adopted
procedures of consent after experiments were publicly criticized. One of the
earliest examples of experimentation that caused an international disturbance
occurred when Italian physician, Giuseppe Sanarelli, injected five subjects with a
solution containing the yellow fever virus without their consent in 1897.176 Even
though the experimentation did not result in any deaths, reports of the
experiments caused “an international uproar”—with the ethics of his
experimentation becoming the principal discussion at medical conferences.177
The following year, influential physicians gathered and discussed Sanarelli’s
work.178 William Osler, the preeminent clinician of the time, in response to
Sanarelli’s method, said: “[t]o deliberately inject a poison of known high degree
of virulency into a human being, unless you obtain that man’s sanction, is not
ridiculous, it is criminal.”179

D. Twentieth Century
By the twentieth century, scientific advancement in understandings of
medicine, illness, and disease increased the regularity of human
experimentation.180 The increase in research was accompanied by an increase in
experimentation being performed on vulnerable populations. Additionally, wars
175
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and colonization drove exploitation, which had a profound impact on the
selection of experimentation subjects.181
During the twentieth century, guiding principles and practices related to
consent were formalized into documents, such as policy statements and
domestic legislation. These early documents usually grew out of a public
controversy. One of the best known experiments of the era was conducted by
Albert Neisser, a German venereologist.182 Neisser infected four prostitutes with
syphilis while trying to develop a vaccine against gonorrhea—without consent.
As a result of his experimentation, Neisser discovered gonococcus, which is the
bacteria that causes gonorrhea. Despite the value of his discoveries, the
non-consensual nature of the experiments resulted in public outrage.183 As a
result of the outrage, the Prussian government assembled a panel of leading
clinicians and lawyers.184 After experts reviewed the case, Neisser was issued a
fine, and the Prussian government issued a directive in 1900 known as the Berlin
Code.185 The directive forbade experiments on individuals without their express
consent.186 The directive stated that “medical interventions other than for
diagnosis and treatment were forbidden under all circumstances if the subject
was a minor, not competent, or had not given clear consent after having the
procedure, including any adverse consequences, explained to him or her.” 187
Additionally, the Code insisted that the fulfilment of the above requirements had
to be documented, and experimentation required authorization by medical
directors.188 While not legally binding, the regulations were among the first
governmental interventions of their kind in the field of human experimentation.
In 1931, the German Reich minister of the interior elaborated on the
guidelines presented in the directive.189 Following the death of 72 children who
received a contaminated vaccine for tuberculosis, the German government
issued a circular entitled “Guidelines for New Therapy and Human
Experimentation.”190 The report reiterated many of the principles outlined in the
181
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early directive, but differed in significant ways. First, it forbade experiments on
dying persons, but allowed experimentation on children if the risk was low. It
also advocated for physicians to be educated on ethical experimentation. Most
importantly, these guidelines were not mere regulation—they became binding
law.191
Despite utilizing vulnerable populations, several researchers mandated the
collection of consent. Beginning in the early 1900s, American physicians Ernest
Linwood Walker and Andrew Sellards began investigating dysentery in the
Philippines.192 At the Bilibid Prison, Walker and Sellards began by explaining the
project to the incarcerated individuals. Additionally, they obtained written
informed consent from each participant prior to beginning the
experimentation.193 Their contributions to the field were not merely new
understandings of amoebic dysentery, but also the utilization of written informed
consent.194 Written informed consent left a narrower space for dispute than mere
verbal consent.
While many experiments conducted in the early twentieth century do not
meet modern understandings of ethical research, they nevertheless utilized a
form of consent. Despite the inadequacy of consent and some contemporary
criticism, the experiments conducted by Joseph Goldberger at Rankin State
Prison starting in 1915 exemplify understanding of the importance of
voluntariness, even for incarcerated subjects—who were largely viewed as
having diminished rights in the early twentieth century.195 Goldberg partnered
with the governor of Mississippi, Earl Brewer, to conduct experimentations
focused on the infectious disease pellagra. Both Goldberg and Brewer met with
inmates, offering them full pardons if they would eat a “traditional Southern diet
for about six months, and therefore run the risk of developing pellagra.”196 The
promise of pardons does complicate the nature of the consent; nevertheless, the
experiment was not a product of physical coercion or secrecy.197
The public’s scrutiny of human experimentation, as well as the legal
consequences for early researchers, helped spur on procedures and policies that
safeguarded consent. Subsequent researchers working in the area of yellow fever
heeded the lessons learned by Sanarelli. One of these researchers, Walter Reed, a
191
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U.S. Army physician, adopted a policy requiring signed permission from all
volunteers in his yellow fever experiments.198 Reed was appointed to lead the
United States Army Yellow Fever Commission of 1900 and 1901. Beginning in
1900, the commission began by experimenting on themselves in Cuba.199 After
receiving approval from military and civilian authorities, Reed established a site
of experimentation in the Cuban countryside.200 The experiments began with 33
total subjects—18 American and 15 Spanish subjects.201 The Spanish subjects
were provided a document that outlined the risks of contracting yellow fever and
also noted that there was no known cure for the disease. 202 The form
emphasized several principles that are consistent with modern understandings of
consent: “the respect for autonomy, the emphasis on voluntariness, the outlining
of risks and benefits, and compensation.”203 One example of the form read as
follows:
The undersigned, Antonio Benino, (signed) Antoni Benino being more than
twenty-five years of age, native of Cerceda, in the province of Corima, the
son of Manuel Benino and Josefa Castro here states by these presents, being
in the enjoyment and exercise of his own free will, that he consents to
submit himself to experiments for the purpose of determining the methods
of transmission of yellow fever, made upon his person by the Commission
appointed for this purpose by the Secretary of War of the United States, and
that he gives his consent to undergo the said experiments for the reasons
and under the conditions stated below.
The undersigned understands perfectly well that in case of the development
of yellow fever in him, that he endangers his life to a certain extent but it
being entirely impossible for him to avoid the infection during his stay in
this island, he prefers to take the chance contracting it intentionally in the
belief that he will receive from the said Commission the greatest care and
the most skillful medical service.
It is understood that at the completion of these experiments, within two
months from this date, the undersigned will receive the sum of $100 in
American gold and that in the case of contracting yellow fever at any time
during his residence in this camp, he will receive in addition to that sum a
further sum of $100 in American gold, upon his recovery and that in case of
his death because of this disease, the Commission will transmit the said sum
198
199
200
201
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(two hundred American dollars) to the person whom the undersigned shall
designate at his convenience.
The undersigned binds himself not to leave the bounds of this camp during
the period of the experiments and will forfeit all right to the benefits named
in this contract if he breaks this agreement.
And to bind himself he signs this paper in duplicate, in the Experimental
Camp, near Quermados, Cuba, on the 26th day of November nineteen
hundred.204

Additionally, Reed included the phrase “with his full consent” in all of his
published reports on yellow fever.205 Reed’s utilization of physical
documentation, a step further than mere verbal agreement, may represent an
increasing need to develop evidence of consent. The formality of the contracts
may indicate that physicians were wary of legal accountability for experiments
deemed unethical. Not only do Reed’s contracts affirm the practice of obtaining
consent, but they also demonstrate a heightened understanding of the obligation.
The formality of the procedures offers compelling evidence that Reed, and
others who engaged in written contracts of this nature, thought of the
attainment of consent as a legal duty to be fulfilled.
Further evidence of an evolving norm of consent, built on ample practice
and opinio juris, were the ways in which publicly critiqued researchers would
adapt their procedures in order to provide more robust autonomy to their
subjects. Richard Pearson Strong, an American physician who was part of the
first medical class at Johns Hopkins, utilized the backlash to his early work in
order to inform more robust procedure for obtaining consent.206 Strong’s
research on nutrition involved trials utilizing prisoners in Bilibid Prison in
Manila. However, his advanced approach to consent was the result of
international backlash to previous, fatal experimentation in the prison. In 1906,
while studying the side effects of a cholera vaccine, twenty-four incarcerated
individuals were injected with a contaminated vaccine.207 As a result, thirteen of
these individuals died after contracting the bubonic plague. In addition to the
error, the incarcerated individuals subjected to the research were not given an
explanation of the experiment, nor did they give consent.208

204

205
206
207
208

William B. Bean, Walter Reed and the Ordeal of Human Experiments, 51 BULL. HIST. MED. 75, 86–87
(1977).
GALLIN & OGNIBENE, supra note 178, at 11.
FRANKENBURG, supra note 11, at 100.
Id. at 99.
Id.

Summer 2018

175

Chicago Journal of International Law

While Strong did not face any criminal liability, the backlash and
repercussions were undeniable.209 Following the deaths, Strong met with the
Governor-General and offered his resignation, which the Governor refused to
accept.210 After a leak to the press, the Governor drafted a public statement.211
Subsequently, newspapers and private journals reported on the Bilibid incident,
but the incident also piqued the attention of the U.S. government.212 Jacob
Gallinger, a senator from New Hampshire and a physician, introduced a
resolution to the Senate, which received unanimous approval.213 The resolution
required the Secretary of War to communicate to the Senate the facts of the
experiment—specifically, the Senate sought to know “whether any of the
persons so experimented upon were previously informed of the dangerous and
possibly fatal character of the experiments.”214 Later correspondence requested
information about whether the vaccine was compulsory or voluntary. While the
result of the investigation was no criminal negligence for Strong, the
investigators questioned his use of individuals who were incarcerated, specifically
noting “how difficult it would have been for prisoners to refuse to cooperate.”215
Despite the lack of official consequences, the ordeal had a direct impact on
Strong’s practices.216 While he never worked with the vaccine again, in 1912
Strong conducted a nutrition experiment once again utilizing individuals
incarcerated in Bilibid.217 Strong’s procedures were materially altered from those
utilized in his cholera vaccine disaster.218 Each prisoner was given documents,
written in their own language, explaining the details of the experiment and
ensuring his voluntary participation.219 As a form of payment, participants were
also offered tobacco products in exchange for their participation. Despite the
fact that the question of whether incarcerated individuals could give full consent
remained unaddressed, Strong’s procedure demonstrated a heightened sensitivity
to the value of expressed consent.220
209

Eli Chernin, Richard Pearson Strong and the Iatrogenic Plague Disaster in Bilibid Prison, Manila, 1906, 11
REV. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 996, 996 (1989).

210

Id. at 998.
Id. at 999.

211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Id.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
FRANKENBURG, supra note 11, at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.

176

Vol. 19 No. 1

Expanding Notions of Self-Determination

Hattix

The increased sensitivity towards expressed consent began to find a place
in mainstream medical dialogue and curriculum. While not a researcher, William
Osler, one of the founding physicians of the Johns Hopkins Hospital, required
full consent in human experimentation.221 An admirer of the work of Walter
Reed, Osler’s contribution to the medical field included his contributions to
medical education—most famously, The Principles and Practice of Medicine, which
became a text famous among medical students and clinicians. 222
In 1907, the Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons met in
Washington D.C. for their seventh triennial session.223 Osler contributed “The
Evolution of the Idea of Experiment in Medicine.”224 As a leading clinician and
ardent supporter of medical experimentation, Osler traced the roots of
experimentation, but also insisted on principles of consent and safety:
For man absolute safety and full consent are the conditions which make
such tests allowable. We have no right to use patients entrusted to our care
for the purpose of experimentation unless direct benefit to the individual is
likely to follow. Once this limit is transgressed, the sacred cord which binds
physician and patient snaps instantly. Risk to the individual may be taken
with his consent and full knowledge of the circumstances, as has been done
in scores of cases, and we cannot honor too highly the bravery of such men
as the soldiers who voluntarily submitted to the experiments on yellow fever
in Cuba under the direction of Reed and Carroll. The history of our
profession is starred with the heroism of its members who have sacrificed
health and sometimes life itself in endeavors to benefit their fellow
creatures. Enthusiasm for science has, in a few instances, led to regrettable
transgressions of the rule I have mentioned, but these are mere specks
which in no wise blur the brightness of the picture—one of the brightest in
the history of human effort—which portrays the incalculable benefits to
man from the introduction of experimentation into the art of medicine.225

In American law, Justice Benjamin Cardozo is often credited for
establishing that informed consent was necessary for self-determination.226 The
landmark case, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,227 involved a woman
with a fibroid tumor. The woman consented to an examination of the fibroid,
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but clearly did not consent to an operation.228 However, while the woman was
anesthetized, the physician, wishing to avoid the risk associated with a second
anesthesia, surgically removed the fibroid.229 In finding liability for the physician,
Cardozo stated: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the
right to determine what shall be done with his body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.”230 Despite the historical credence given to the
Schloendorff case, case notes and records from physicians pre-1914 indicate the
utilization of consent in practice.231
The proliferation of human experimentation was not merely limited to the
U.S. From 1930 to 1945, human experimentation in Japan burgeoned.232 Much
of this research grew out of efforts to establish Japanese biological warfare (BW)
techniques for use against Soviet troops.233 Under Lieutenant General Shirô
Ishii, biological weapons research flourished as military and medical forces
aligned to carry out human experimentation.234 In 1936, Ishii was appointed as
chief of the Kwantung Army’s Water Purification Bureau, which “became a
cover for the developing network of BW personnel located in Harbin (Unit 731),
Peking (Unit 1855), Nanking (Unit 1644), Canton (Unit 8604), and Singapore
(Unit 9420).”235
In postwar interrogation, Kawashima Kyoshi, chief of the Production
Division of Unit 731 from 1941 to 1943, acknowledged occupied territories were
used to obtain persons for human experimentation who were not of Japanese
nationality.236 Over a ten-year period, Unit 731 carried out human
experimentation that resulted in an estimated 3,000 deaths.237 Individuals,
typically resisters of Japanese rule, were infected with plagues, inoculated with
experimental vaccines, forced to drink typhoid-contaminated water, and exposed
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to freezing temperatures as a means of studying frostbite.238 Aerial bombs
containing bacteria were dropped as a means of investigating how best to carry
out biological warfare.239
Despite the expansive nature of the medical experimentation, efforts were
made to conceal their true brutality.240 Scientific journals and papers
documenting the experimentation often obscurely referred to the humans
utilized as mere “research material, sometimes disguised as ‘monkeys,’241 and
often disparagingly called maruta (logs).”242 In later testimony, it was revealed that
“the designation as ‘logs’ was used for ‘security reasons.’” 243 Additionally, when
the Soviet Union advanced in Manchuria in August of 1945, all evidence of the
medical atrocities was intentionally destroyed by the Japanese Army.244 The
efforts taken to dehumanize and hide the contours of the experimentation offer
some evidentiary basis that there was at least a moral, if not legal, understanding
of the unjustified brutality of the experimentation.
After the war, U.S. forces did investigate Unit 731, but the Japanese
researchers and military personnel escaped punishment for their war crimes.245
From 1945 to 1946, during the Kamakura Conference, American officials and
Unit 731 members created an agreement: in return for the immunity of Ishii and
his researchers, American authorities received access to the results of their
experimentation.246 The U.S. State-War-Navy (Departments) Coordinating
Committee outlined in a secret report that “[t]he value to the U.S. of Japanese
BW [biological warfare] data is of such importance to national security as to far
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outweigh the value accruing from ‘war crimes’ prosecution.”247 Additionally, a
1947 report detailing the alleged human experimentation stated, “[s]uch
information could not have been obtained in our own laboratories because of
scruples attached to human experimentation.”248
Despite the lack of accountability imposed by the U.S., beginning on
December 25, 1949, the Soviet Union tried twelve members of Unit 731 in the
Khabarovsk trials.249 However, “the West dismissed the trials as communist
propaganda and not much attention was paid to the proceedings.”250 While the
trials did not gain much attention, the transcripts present a portrait of medical
personnel and military awareness of the legal liability they might face if their
experimentation was discovered:
Question: What do you wish to add to your testimony?
Answer: I fully realize that Detachment 731 was a criminal organization
which manufactured means for exterminating human beings by barbarous
methods prohibited by international rules. . . . Serving in the detachment,
I participated in these criminal activities and committed a crime against
humanity, for which I must pay the penalty.251

The Japanese military personnel were charged under Article 1 of the Decree of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.252 While the language of the
Article focused on war crimes and did not specifically mention consent, the trial
included an expert commission on bacteriological and medical issues. 253
Furthermore, the indictments were divided into four categories, one being “the
commission of criminal experiments on living human subjects.”254 The charges
for participation in human experimentation were brought against four
defendants while three others were “accused of knowingly permitting the
experiments to proceed.”255
During arguments, L. Smirnov, State Counsel for the Prosecution, stated:
247
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It has been proved that, in Unit 731, inhuman experiments on living human
subjects were carried out not only for research into bacteriological warfare.
There were also, no less inhuman and painful experiments, which . . . were
carried out on a larger scale. These experiments were aimed at determining
the limits of a human organism’s endurance under specific conditions, and
at studying . . . the prevention and treatment of non-infectious disease.256

The reliability of the Khabarovsk Trial remains contested.257 While some
individuals have dismissed it as mere propaganda, in recent years authors have
argued that portions of the trial present irrefutable data. Among these voices is
bioethicist Nie Jing-Bao, who has stated that “the trial established beyond
reasonable doubt the facts about Japanese BW war crimes including systematic
cruel human experimentation, and its conclusions turn out to be remarkably
accurate.”258
While on their own these case studies highlight foundational principles of
consent, an analysis of these principles in light of The Nuremberg Trial
highlights the true prominence of these norms.

IV. A SSESSING C ONSENT IN L IGHT OF N UR EMBERG
A. Background Information
The Nuremberg Trials occurred from 1946 to 1947 and featured twentythree medical scientists and physicians.259 These scientists and physicians were
charged with murder and torture-related crimes, which took place in the context
of medical experimentation on imprisoned individuals in concentration camps. 260
The specific allegations asserted that the experiments “were sadistic and often
lethal, and the prisoners did not give their consent.”261
Interestingly, the testimony of various individuals, most notably Werner
Leibbrandt and Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, vigorously referenced the obligation of every
physician to obtain consent.262 While they each had a different theoretical
understanding of consent, the crux of their testimony was undeniable: consent
was necessary in order to conduct ethical experimentation.263
256
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258
259
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B. The Testimony of Werner Leibbrandt
One of the leading experts the prosecution called to testify was Werner
Leibbrandt.264 Leibbrandt, a neuropsychiatrist and a medical historian, was
persecuted by the Nazis because of his political views and his marriage to a
Jewish woman.265 Leibbrandt’s testimony included an analysis of the ways in
which Hitler, as well as doctors generally, perverted Hippocratic ethics in their
programs of involuntary euthanasia, medical experimentation without consent,
and various torturous experiments.266 One of the doctors he cited was Albert
Moll, an internationally known and respected physician who “as early as 1920
had denounced doctors who conducted experiments on patients without their
consent.”267
Additionally, Leibbrandt condemned the medical experimentation on the
basis of one of the longest standing moral codes: the Hippocratic Oath. 268
Specifically, Leibbrandt testified, “[t]he Hippocratic Oath had been the universal
legal and moral code of physicians for 22 centuries and had explicitly forbidden
causing harm to patients, injustice, and immorality. Nazi doctors and SS
members who had said they relied on the Hippocratic Oath in their practices
were simply grotesque.”269
However, Leibbrandt’s condemnation of the experimentation went further.
During cross-examination, the defense lawyers argued that common good was
superior to individual welfare.270 Unmoved by anecdotes of experiments
conducted in other nations on incarcerated peoples without their consent,
Leibbrandt boldly asserted that all experiments on imprisoned individuals were
unethical because the coercive nature of their situation precluded voluntary
consent.271 Underlying Leibbrandt’s argument was an emphasis on the humanity
of the individuals subjected to experimentation—his argument was consistent
with understandings of bodily autonomy.
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The relevance of Leibbrandt’s testimony is that it almost exclusively relied
on evidence that consent was the normative conduct expected from physicians.
Not only was acknowledgment of the necessity of consent widespread, as
evidenced by Leibbrandt’s citation of Dr. Moll, but also that it had historical
roots, as evidenced by his reference to the longstanding Hippocratic Oath.
Leibbrandt’s testimony thoroughly conflicts with the idea that the consent
concept articulated post-1945 was novel—instead, he articulates a pre-existing
history of ethics and consent upon which the experiments were legally
condemnable.

C. The Testimony of Dr. Andrew C. Ivy
The only physician to testify during the trials was an American doctor,
Andrew C. Ivy, the former director of the Naval Medical Research Institute. 272
Ivy was nominated by the American Medical Association (AMA) after they were
tasked with selecting an individual with expertise on the “rules and practices in
prison research.”273 Lasting three days and comprising 295 pages of the official
transcript, Ivy’s testimony focused on conditions of research in “civilized”
nations, common research principles, and physician obligations.274
Prior to the trial, Ivy had been tasked with examining the conditions of
experimentation in various states. The culmination of his findings were three
principles that “reflected ‘common agreement and research practices.’”275 The
first principle read: “Consent of the human participant must be obtained. All
participants have been volunteers in the absence of coercion in any form. Before
volunteering, participants have been informed of the hazards, if any.”276
Despite his articulation of consent, Ivy’s testimony diverged from
Leibbrandt’s views on incarcerated individuals participating in medical
experimentation. Unlike Leibbrandt, Ivy determined that someone who was
incarcerated may be a volunteer when “a competent person says ‘yes’ or ‘no’
without fear of being punished or deprived of privilege due him in the ordinary
course of events.”277 However, the significant overlap in Ivy and Leibbrandt’s
understanding of common practice was that medical experiments required
consent.
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While Ivy acknowledged in cross-examination that there were no written
research principles in the United States before 1946, the principles he developed
were not devoid of any history.278 Throughout his testimony, Ivy frequently
stated that he relied on Hippocratic ethics; however, he eventually had to admit
that there were “differences between a treating physician who acts in his
patients’ best interests and a physician-investigator whose goal is to test a
scientific hypothesis for the benefit of society rather than the participant.”279
Like Leibbrant, Ivy’s testimony relied on an analysis of state practice
regarding experimentation. In fact, Ivy’s practice of ascertaining what the
common research practice was is not dissimilar to the inquiry being undertaken
in this historical analysis: to ascertain what widespread beliefs about
experimentation would have created the obligation to establish consent from
subjects. Again, Ivy’s ability to draw these conclusions undermines Katz’s view
of the historical development of consent—Ivy was able to establish consent as a
common research principle based on pre-1945 standards.

D. The Impact of the Testimony
The impact of both Ivy and Leibbrandt’s analysis is evident in the
Nuremberg judgment. In closing argument, chief prosecutor James McHaney
stated, “[i]f the experimental subjects cannot be said to have volunteered, then
the inquiry need proceed no further . . . This requirement reflects not just the
view of an individual or of an American doctor, but the opinion of all medical
men, and decent people of the civilized world.”280 This sentiment was reflected
in the court’s ultimate judgment, which articulated the right to “voluntary,
competent, informed, and understood consent.”281
Disturbingly, at the time of the Nazi experiments, Germany had some of
the most advanced regulations on medical ethics in the world.282 In fact,
physicians could hardly claim ignorance as, post-1933, two comprehensive
governmental guidelines had been implemented.283 The impact of the first was to
unequivocally state that consent was required for research, but regardless,
vulnerable subjects were not to be research participants.284 The second, which
278
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was legally binding under State law, reiterated the necessity of consent, but went
a step further in banning high-risk experiments on children or terminally ill
individuals.285
As part of their defense, the lawyers representing the Nazi physicians
argued that the conditions of experimentation were similar to the Stateville
prison experiments.286 There, in conjunction with the U.S. Army, the University
of Chicago began a series of malaria experiments at Stateville Penitentiary in
1944. While portions of the experiments are now considered unethical, one
distinguishing factor from the Nazi experiments was the use of written and
signed consent. After researchers explained the study to the incarcerated
individuals, each inmate signed consent forms. The Stateville experiments were
well publicized and received coverage in Life magazine. In all publications, the
subjects were referred to as “voluntary subjects,” and most mentioned that they
were “proud to be contributing to the war effort.”287
The conclusions here are threefold. First, the standards articulated in
Nuremberg did not merely emerge. Instead, they track onto a widespread norm
in which physicians conducting research perceived an obligation to receive legal
permission. Second, the actual principles articulated by The Nuremberg Code
were not radical; rather, previous German regulations held physicians
conducting experimentation to a higher standard of consent. Lastly, despite the
undoubtedly questionable ethics promulgated in various studies around the
globe, the prosecution was required to distinguish cases based on their utilization
of some form of consent. In this way, the American doctors as well as much of
the world were only able to resist culpability for their experimentation by
contending that an obligation of consent existed prior to 1945.
This Comment only provides an overview of legal and social history, but
also omits a multitude of cases where physician and research behavior did not
conform to the suggested norm. Despite the prevalence of these examples, their
existence does not foreclose the claim being made. The character of customary
international law is such that “[i]t is inherently not consensual.”288 Unlike other
law, customary international law comes from normative, but not uniformly
existing beliefs.289 While customary law does require a practice to be widespread,
it recognizes the limitations on this requirement by not demanding full
agreement.290 Indeed, some scholars have even argued that in certain
285
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circumstances considerable countervailing practice may not foreclose a finding
of a sufficient customary norm.291
While the question of consent was present throughout the early twentieth
century, the question was narrow. Contemplations of consent, both in practice
and scholarly works, did not usually address whether vulnerable populations,
such as individuals who were incarcerated or psychiatric patients, were able to
give fully informed consent.292

V. E STABLI SHING C US TOMARY I NTERNATIONAL L AW B ASED
ON T HE P RECEDING H ISTORICA L A NALYSIS
Before the 1850s, the idea of human experimentation in the medical
context primarily focused on experiments that were conducted for the benefit of
the individual.293 “[H]uman experimentation—interfering with human bodies to
try to understand how they work and help healing—happened only occasionally
and usually on a small scale.”294 However, technological advancements of the
nineteenth century allowed human experimentation to flourish. Its prominence
simultaneously brought life-saving interventions and brutal exploitation.
The first component necessary for establishing customary international
law, widespread practice, is evidenced by the multitude of doctors, across
different nations and engaging in a variety of experiments, who utilized
increasingly formalized methods of consent. The preeminent clinician of the
nineteenth century, Osler, responded to non-consensual methods of
experimentation with not mere disgust, but assertions that it was criminal. 295
Forty-five years prior to the Nuremberg Trials, the state of Prussia issued a
directive that explicitly forbade experimentation without consent.296 In 1930, the
German Minister of Interior picked up on the directive.297 Even in American
prisons, physicians materially altered their methods—particularly after coming
291
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under public scrutiny.298 The historical analysis demonstrates that the custom of
evidence was not merely widespread geographically, but widespread in its
application to particularized populations.
The second element, opinio juris or the belief that this conduct is engaged in
on the basis of legal obligation, is evidenced by changing state policies, domestic
law, and the responsiveness of physicians to their peers’ legal entanglements. In
the eighteenth century, the English common law began to define and enforce
obligations of the physician to respect a right to bodily integrity through battery
theories of liability.299 This evolved through case law, notably Slater v. Baker &
Stapleton,300 which gave notice to physicians—consent was not a mere moral
musing, but a legal obligation. The nineteenth century built on these obligations
as physicians faced growing scrutiny, professional disgrace, and even court
verdicts of “guilty for failure to obtain consent.”301 Reinforcing that this
obligation was not merely confined to Western nations, the yellow fever
experiments of India and Cuba reveal that the obligation of consent did not end
at one’s own geographical borders.302 Instead, the formalized documentation of
physicians and researchers, such as Reed, reinforce the increased formality with
which consent was sought.

VI. C ONCLUSION
In an effort to address the exploitative conditions of experimentation in
the modern era, the International Criminal Court opened in 2002.303 As a
“permanent Nuremberg,” the court has jurisdiction over biological experiments,
torture, and inhuman treatment. Despite this jurisdictional oversight of human
experimentation, the U.S. has refused to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the
court.304 Most oversight and accountability of human experimentation remains
limited to peer ethical review, federal regulation, and domestic law—specifically
tort law.305 Despite widespread recognition of the prominence of Nuremberg,
federal regulations, at least in the U.S., have departed from Nuremberg in
significant ways. Most notably, these regulations “address medical institutions
that sponsored research, rather than physicians and scientists who actually
298

Id. at 100.

299

Pernick, supra note 27, at 4.
Gallin, supra note 124, at 9.

300
301
302
303
304
305

Tan & Graham, supra note 149, at 521.
Bennett & Bannerman, supra note 167, at 192; FRANKENBURG, supra note 11, at 149.
Annas, supra note 93, at 43.
Id.
Id.

Summer 2018

187

Chicago Journal of International Law

conducted research; and their protections were primarily procedural (including
the review board and forms) rather than substantive.”306
Today, informed consent is distended by complex forms, the primary
concern of which is protecting institutions from liability, rather than the bodily
autonomy of human subjects.307 Too often, the subjects of this experimentation
are vulnerable individuals. From incarcerated men in Philadelphia being exposed
to agents of chemical warfare,308 to the injection of viral hepatitis in children
with developmental disabilities,309 cases of disregard for ethical standards are not
difficult to come by. While not a holistic solution in and of itself, expanding the
notion of the custom of informed consent is part of the expanding opportunities
for legal liability and requiring higher standards of accountability.
The atrocities of Nuremberg, and the subsequent Codes that resulted, had
the effect of characterizing the crimes of the Nazi physicians as exceptional. The
sadism of the experimentation led to physicians asserting that the principles
articulated by The Nuremberg Code were not applicable to their “less sadistic”
experimentation. By demonstrating, through a historical analysis, the obligation
that existed to informed consent in medical experimentation pre-1945,
physicians are not given the same opportunity to disregard their customary
obligation.

306

Id. at 44.

307

Id.
Barron H. Lerner, Subjects or Objects? Prisoners and Human Experimentation, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED.
356 (2007).
Eric G. Yan & Kerim M. Munir, Regulatory and Ethical Principles in Research Involving Children and
Individuals with Developmental Disabilities, 14 ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 31, 32 (2004).

308

309

188

Vol. 19 No. 1

